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due process is with the fair administration of justice."" In so doing, the Court
recognized Justice Black's reasoning in Green'--that is, that a judge in such a
situation could not determine punishment without actual bias, thus denying the
contemnor due process of law.
The Court in Mayberry did not set down any specific guidelines, stating that
"[gleneralizations are difficult."' However, the Court did add a new qualifica-
tion to the prior tests of Fisher, Offutt, and Ungar, which looked to the facts of
each case to determine the extent of the emotional involvement of the trial
judge. In effect, the Court adopted a timing test that requires disqualification if
the judge waits until the end of the trial to act on the contempt. At the same
time, the new qualification allows the judge to assess punishment on the same
contempt charge if he acts at the instant of the contempt.
IV. CONCLUSION
The most serious impact of Mayberry is that the Court limited the exercise
of the summary contempt power by requiring a different judge for conviction
if the presiding judge waits until the end of the trial to exercise his summary
contempt power. Although the Court does not make such a prediction, it seems
apparent that its holding will distinctly encourage the prompt handling of con-
temptuous conduct in open court. In light of Mayberry and the Court's prior
holding in Illinois v. Allen," the Court seems bent on avoiding delay and en-
couraging trial judges to use their arsenal of authority to deal instantly with
disruptive persons in the courtroom. Thus, the Court effectively discourages the
imposition of harsh summary sentences for contempts at the conclusion of the
trial, thereby eliminating a procedure which on its face lacks the fundamental
fairness inherent in due process. Nevertheless, although Mayberry avoids this
unseemly post-trial pronouncement of large contempt sentences, the incentive
it provides for trial judges to hastily cite and sentence contemnors is to be re-
gretted.
Steven R. Jenkins
Parr v. Municipal Court: An Abortive Attempt
To Keep Hippies Off the Grass
During the summer of 1968 Carmel-by-the-Sea, California, experienced an
unusual influx of transients.' In the opinion of its city council, at least, many
were susceptible of classification as "hippies." Subsequently the city council
passed an ordinance for the express purpose of regulating conduct on public
Id. at 465.
"See note 32 supra, and accompanying text.
" 400 U.S. at 463.
58397 U.S. 337 (1970).
'Carmel is located on the scenic Monterey Peninsula. Since tourism is a principal eco-
nomic resource, it appears that the major concern was not the mere fact that there was an
influx of transients, but rather who or what these persons were perceived to be.
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property One of the operative subsections of that ordinance made it unlaw-
ful "to lie or sit upon any [public] lawns."' The plaintiff, a local merchant,
was arrested while attending a public gathering in one of the city's parks. Plain-
tiff then sought a writ of prohibition from the superior court to restrain the
municipal court from proceeding with her trial. She appealed the superior
court's order denying her petition. Held, reversed: The discriminatory purpose
of a municipal ordinance, made explicit by its accompanying declaration of
urgency,4 invalidates the measure because it violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Parr v. Munici-
pal Court, 3 Cal. 3d 861, 479 P.2d 353, 92 Cal. Rptr. 153, cert. denied, 92
S. Ct. 46 (1971).
I. RELEVANCY OF LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OR MOTIVE TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has provided a
basis from which to judge the constitutionality of legislative classifications.' The
established rule is that a classification does not deny equal protection if it is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective, so that under the law
all those who are similarly situated will be similarly treated.! If found unrea-
sonable, a classification may be held to invalidate a measure as violative of the
equal protection guarantee.7 One may argue, however, that the proscription of
the equal protection clause reaches legislative behavior well beyond its function
as a limitation upon permissible legislative classification.! Specifically, it has
2 CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 697.02 (1968).3 Id. § 697.02 (2) (b).
" The urgency declaration provided:
This is an urgency ordinance adopted to preserve the public peace and safety
pursuant to [Cal.) Gov't Code § 36937, and shall take effect immediately.
The City Council of the City of Carmel-by-the-Sea has observed an extra-
ordinary influx of undesirable and unsanitary visitors to the City, sometimes
known as 'hippies,' and finds that unless proper regulations are adopted im-
mediately, the use and enjoyment of public property will be jeopardized if not
entirely eliminated; the public parks and beaches are, in many cases, rendered
unfit for normal public use by the unregulated and uncontrolled conduct of
the new transients.
Id. § 697.02.
, See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341, 342-56 (1949).
8 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Tuss-
man & tenBroek, supra note 5, at 344.
'See United States v. Cantrell, 307 F. Supp. 259, 264 (E.D. La. 1969).
The subsequent career of the equal protection clause as a standard for the
criticism of legislation has moved along several lines. First, it has operated as
a limitation upon permissible legislative classification. This is its most familiar
role. Second, it is used to oppose 'discriminatory' legislation. And third, it
shares with due process the task of imposing 'substantive' limits upon the ex-
ercise of the police power.
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 5, at 342-43. The "reach" of the equal protection clause
is apparently circumscribed only by the ingenuity of counsel schooled in the now almost
all-inclusive scope of the concept. The term "equal protection of the laws" has been de-
scribed as an assertion of great generality "necessarily intended for permanence," and aptly
suited as a standard for judicial review of legislation. See generally Bickel, The Original Un-
derstanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59-63 (1955). It still seems
remarkable to note that but a generation after Justice Holmes' famous reference to equal
protection as the "usual last resort of constitutional arguments" in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200, 208 (1927), the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Brown v. Board of Educ.,
been argued that the clause may serve as the basis for a critique of legislative
purpose.
The concept of legislative purpose is at least latently ambiguous. On the one
hand, the purpose of a given legislative measure is to be ascertained with refer-
ence to the goals or objectives it seeks to accomplish. On the other hand, how-
ever, legislative purpose may be found in those subjective and relatively internal
considerations that contributed to the measure's passage by a majority of the
legislature. As an all-inclusive concept, therefore, legislative purpose must
always represent a confluence of objective and subjective criteria. Purpose,
broadly considered, includes motivation."
The courts have been understandably reluctant to extend their scope of re-
view beyond the objective side of the concept of legislative purpose," regardless
of the availability of the equal protection rationale. Motivation is such a com-
plex psychological concept that it is highly unlikely that any legislator would
be able to analyze thoroughly the relationship between those objective and
subjective considerations that dictated a particular legislative decision. It is in-
finitely less likely that a court can make an ex post facto determination of that
same relationship, particularly when that determination must be multiplied by
the total number of legislators voting for a given measure. The general rule
that a court will not consider the subjective side of legislative purpose--i.e.,
legislative motivation-seems well founded."
However, the assertion that "[alcts generally lawful may become unlawful
when done to accomplish an unlawful end"'" may itself be an admission that
motivation may be reviewed by a court. 4 Of course, it could be that the asser-
tion stands "not for the proposition that legislative motive is a proper basis for
declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable effect of a statute
on its face may render it unconstitutional."'" Clearly the United States Supreme
Court is not yet willing to subscribe to a "doctrine of discriminatory legisla-
tion,"" a doctrine grounded in the demand for purity of legislative motivation."
It remains arguable that the principle articulated by the Court, that the equal
protection standard applies only to a construction of the legislation on its face,
is, nevertheless, flexible enough to extend the substantive dimensions of the
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Perhaps the new "all-pervasiveness" of the equal protection clause
is best explained by concluding that this clause, above any other in the United States Con-
stitution, follows the sociological development of the country more rapidly. Thus, any at-
tempt at definition becomes dated quickly. This principle has been stated succinctly by at
least one writer in the field: "Once loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily cabined." Cox,
Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 91 (1966).
STussman & tenBroek, supra note 5, at 357.
"See generally Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1207 (1970).
"That is to say, courts will review only the goals or objectives apparent from the face
of the enactment or revealed by the pattern of enforcement. Id.
"Id. at 1212-17.
"3 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960), quoting United States v. Reading
Co., 226 U.S. 324, 357 (1912).
'" Ely, supra note 10, at 1209.
5 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384-85 (1968) (emphasis added). This is
not the traditional distinction between statutes unconstitutional on their face and statutes
unconstitutionally applied. See discussion in text accompanying note 32 infra.
"See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 5, at 356-61.
" Id. at 358. See also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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equal protection guarantee beyond a determination of the reasonableness of
legislative classifications. For instance, the Court recognizes the existence of a
category of "suspect criteria," the mere legislative use of which requires the
demonstration of a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify allow-
ing the classification to stand." In addition, it is possible for a court to consider
the "face" of a statute or ordinance as including certain elements, such as a
title or preamble, which might not otherwise come under judicial scrutiny. 9
In an effort to shorten the elapsed time between the passage of an ordinance
and the time it will take effect, some jurisdictions allow a measure to be enacted
under urgency or emergency procedures." The California provision requires
the city council to include in the ordinance a declaration of urgency, setting
forth the facts which constitute the emergency that the measure is intended to
treat." Clearly the urgency declaration can be resorted to in order for a review-
ing court to ascertain whether an emergency did in fact exist."' The result of a
determination that there was no emergency would not invalidate the measure,
however; the effective date of the measure would simply be postponed, just as
if there had been no urgency provision. Should the declaration of urgency be
affixed to the measure as a preamble, it could be resorted to in an effort to as-
certain the objectives of the city council, but such resort cannot be had unless
the operative sections of the ordinance are so vague and ambiguous as to make
it otherwise practically impossible to determine the governmental objectives."
To the extent that the operative sections are themselves clear and unambiguous,
any apparent inconsistency in the preamble would not be within the purview of
the reviewing court.'
Thus, two principles can be derived from the foregoing: (1) the equal pro-
tection clause does not demand a critique of legislative purpose to the extent
that such purpose is held to be synonymous with legislative motivation; and
(2) a declaration of urgency affixed to an ordinance as a preamble cannot be
held determinative of the governmental objectives of the measure unless the
operative sections of the measure are so ambiguous as to leave the matter clear-
ly in doubt.
II. PARR V. MUNICIPAL COURT
In contradistinction to the foregoing principles is the opinion of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Parr v. Municipal Court." The court must have been
aware that certain factors militated against its selection of equal protection
grounds as a basis for review. The regulations of the ordinance had been uni-
formly imposed upon all persons who used public property. The sole reference
"See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
"See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1915).
2"See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 36937 (West 1966).
21 Id.
2"Ex parte Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 P. 517, 519 (1909).
2399 P. at 520.
146 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 20.59 (3d ed. rev.
1969), citing United States v. Fisher, 1 U.S. (2 Cranch) 496 (1804).
21Id., citing Crescent City v. Griffin, 31 Cal. App. 2d 133, 87 P.2d 414 (1939).
"3 Cal. 3d 861, 479 P.2d 353, 92 Cal. Rptr. 153, cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 46 (1971).
(Vol. 2 5
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to hippies"' was found in the urgency declaration. Mrs. Parr was manifestly not
a hippie, and the record apparently disclosed no arrest of a hippie under the or-
dinance. Nevertheless, the entire measure was stricken as violative of the equal
protection clause.
The court in Parr purported to add another dimension to the "traditional
focus" of the equal protection clause. Relying essentially upon the "doctrine"
first announced by Tussman and tenBroek, the court asserted that a legis-
lative enactment must be related to a permissible purpose."5 One might assume
that a permissible purpose could be practically any governmental objective
embodied in a measure enacted to preserve the public peace, health, or safety,"
but it is apparent that the court intended another meaning. A permissible pur-
pose, according to the court, is one which is demonstrably untainted by hostile
and prejudiced attitudes attributable to the legislators themselves.' The court
thus utilizes the equal protection clause as a cognitive basis for criticizing and
ultimately rejecting as illicit the motivations of Carmel's city council.
The language of the urgency declaration accompanying the ordinance was
unquestionably hostile, and it surely represented the attitudes of most of the
councilmen toward those individuals they classified as "hippies." But it was also
clear that the conduct of the "new transients," at least to the extent that that
conduct bore a direct relationship to the resultant destruction of the public parks
and beaches of Carmel, was an important concern. In addition, there was no
suggestion that the "undesirables" were the only individuals who were using
the parks and beaches in question. The court, nevertheless, concluded that the
operative sections of the ordinance were intended to be applied solely to
"hippies," and that the measure was, therefore, an impermissible attempt to
drive the hippies not only out of the parks, but also out of the city. With respect
27The term "hippie" probably connotes the personification of a thorough-going non-
acceptance of contemporary customs, values, and mores. A "hippie" openly and self-con-
sciously espouses a life style which diametrically opposes that of the status quo. See gen-
erally T. WOLFE, THE ELECTRIC KOOL-AID ACID TEST (1968). Some courts have already
recognized that someone who might be designated a "hippie" may be subjected to genuine
invidious discrimination at the hands of those who enforce the laws and are otherwise re-
sponsible for the continuation of legal processes. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F.
Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971);, Hughes v.
Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968). That is to say, a hippie may run a very real
risk of being prejudged not for what he has done, but for what he is, or at least for what he
appears to be. See Frazier v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 287, 486 P.2d 694, 95 Cal. Rptr.
798 (1971). Apparently this development has not reached the point at which it may fairly
be said that "hippie" is a suspect criterion for legislative classification. Arguably, though,
a better way to achieve the result this court intended would have been to take this further
step. See discussion in text following note 42 infra.2 8Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 5, at 357-59. The dissent pointed out that this reli-
ance was arguably misplaced:
[TJhe consideration of motive is complicated by the fact that it is altogether
possible for a law which is the expression of a forbidden motive to be a good
law. What is to be done with a law which, passed with the most questionable
of motives, still makes a positive contribution to the public good? Suppose
the legislature decides to 'get' Standard Oil, or Lovett, or Petrillo, but does
so through a law which hits all monopolies, all government employees, or all
labor unions.
Id. at 360. In such an instance the dissent would follow the traditional line of authority and
would uphold the ordinance.
"
9 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 36937 (West 1966).
"03 Cal. 3d at 864, 479 P.2d at 355, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 155; Tussman & tenBroek, supra
note 5, at 357-59.
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to its probable impact, the ordinance was: (1) effectively a mandate to those
responsible for enforcing the law to apply it discriminatorily against hippies;
and (2) a less-than-subtle legislative effort designed to encourage private
discrimination by local citizens against a "cultural minority."'"
This "probable-impact" argument appears to be a form of the "unconstitu-
tional-as-applied" branch of the equal protection doctrine. Apparently, the
court, by considering the declaration of urgency as a part of the ordinance, pri-
marily considered that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because
the declaration of urgency made it impossible to enforce the ordinance nondis-
criminatorily. This reasoning seems to be based on some "true" unconstitutional-
as-applied cases, and primarily on an extension of the reasoning of the Cali-
fornia courts in Mulkey v. Reitman." Mulkey invalidated a California constitu-
tional amendment which said that the state would not interfere when private
citizens discriminated against minorities in the sale of the citizens' private homes.
The California courts, and the United States Supreme Court, held that this pub-
lic act effectively encouraged private discrimination, and was, thus, discrimina-
tion by state action proscribed by the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. It would require but one more step to say that in Parr the
urgency declaration effectively encouraged public discriminatory enforcement,
such that the ordinance could not stand. This would be a sort of "predeter-
mined," unconstitutional-as-applied holding.
Finally, the court failed to utilize other possible constitutional infirmities to
invalidate the ordinance." Primarily, the ordinance itself, apart from the dec-
laration of urgency, would have been very vulnerable to a charge of over-
breadth. Legitimate legislative goals "cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
reached."34 The ordinance of the city effectively prohibited almost all activity in
the city's parks except sedately walking in the open areas. Under the ordinance
it would have been almost impossible even for children to play in the parks in
their customary fashion. The court could very easily have classified the ordi-
nance as overbroad and required the city council to enact a properly narrow
"The reasoning that allowed this court to consider legislative motivation as a basis for
invalidating the ordinance might be based on the rationale found in Ely, supra note 10, and
MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966). These authorities reflect an argu-
ment made in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which it was stated that
judicial consideration of legislative motivation is prohibited except in those cases in which
"the inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional." Id. at 383. The
California court here chose not to delineate carefully the reasoning it used to reach its con-
clusion in this regard. Alternatively, this reasoning might be based on a strained argument
extending the doctrine enunciated by the California courts in Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d
529, 533-34, 413 P.2d 825, 828, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (1966), aff'd, 387 U.S. 369
(1967). See text following this note infra. Necessarily, this is speculative, the court not
having clearly chosen either alternative.
264 Cal. 2d 529, 533-34, 413 P.2d 825, 828, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (1966), aff'd,
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
'The court declined to reach any of the four other rationales for reversal: (1) the
ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad; (2) the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and
ambiguous; (3) the field governed by the ordinance has been preempted by state law; and
(4) the ordinance was ineffectively adopted as an urgency measure. 3 Cal. 3d at 863 n.2,
479 P.2d at 355 n.2, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 155 n.2.34 Shelton v. Tucker. 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also the two opinions in Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) [Cox I), and 379 U.S. 559 (1965) [Cox I1]. That this
would appear to be the type of "blunderbuss" measure the proscription is designed to com-
bat is borne out in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 58 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 2 5
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ordinance proscribing only that conduct that had a demonstrable effect of
destroying city property.
It is remarkable' that the court in Parr chose not to reproduce a greater por-
tion of its own logical processes that contributed ultimately to its holding. "
There was no indication that the record disclosed facts, apart from the presence
of hostile language in the urgency declaration, that would allow the court to
overcome the general presumption of constitutionality of purpose and applica-
tion when laws are enacted by and for the people."7 Yet the court found reason
to suggest that the entire transaction could be viewed as an example of official
bad faith.
The court did not consider whether its decision would have been altered had
the ordinance been enacted without its urgency declaration. There was a strong
implication, however, that the offending declaration merely made the court's
task easier, and that so long as "[a] state enactment cannot be construed for
purposes of constitutional analysis without concern for its immediate objective
S.. and for its ultimate effect"' 8 the court both could and would have struck
down the ordinance. "
One might feel constrained to admire the strong stand taken by the Supreme
Court of California in opposition to official discrimination against an ill-defined
social caste like hippies. It is submitted, nevertheless, that the opinion of the
court focuses too much attention upon the status of hippies and too little at-
tention upon their conduct, qua individuals. It is submitted that the conclusion
that the ordinance could not have been enforced indiscriminately by the offi-
cials of Carmel is unwarranted upon the facts presented.
III. CONCLUSION
It is evident that in Parr the Supreme Court of California was concerned with
the protection of hippies."0 It would appear that better methods were available
- Particularly in view of Judge Burke's dissenting opinion. 3 Cal. 3d at 871-73, 479
P.2d at 360-62, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 160-62.
3 For example, consider this statement:
The council's rhetoric thus singles out hippies as a social group consisting of
unsanitary transients whose presence in Carmel is deemed to be undesirable.
It would appear to follow that the operative sections of the statute are intended
to be limited to hippies in their application, since hippies are the only iden-
tified source of the danger to Carmel's public property and have been officially
declared an unsanitary and undesirable group. The irrefragable implication is
that the Carmel City Council sought, through Municipal Code section 697.02,
to rid the city of the blight it perceived to be created by the presence of the
hippies.
Id. at 865, 479 P.2d at 356, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 156 (emphasis added).
3
'In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 168 P.2d 706, 714 (1946). See also Kissinger v.
City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10, 16 (1958).
"
8 Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 533-34, 413 P.2d 825, 828, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881,
884 (1966), af'd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
" "But we may not blind ourselves to official pronouncements of a hostile and discrimi-
natory purpose solely because the ordinance employs facially neutral language." 3 Cal. 3d
at 865, 479 P.2d at 356, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 156. "[W]e are not ... forbidden to know as
judges what we see as men .... " Id., quoting Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252
(No. 6546) (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
" Aside from references to this fact in Parr itself, see note 36 supra, subsequently the
same judge who delivered this opinion had occasion to discuss it again in Frazier v. Superior
Court, 5 Cal. 3d 287, 486 P.2d 694, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1971). In Frazier a hippie sought
1971]
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to accomplish this purpose. Instead of choosing the doubtful path of looking to
legislative motive, the court could have easily, and on sound legal grounds,
found the ordinance overbroad or vague. Hippies must be given equal protec-
tion of the laws; however, so must everyone else. What better way to accom-
plish both than to insure that legislative enactments are carefully and narrowly
drawn? Protection of public parks is a valid legislative purpose, but as public
forums special attention must be given them to insure that their use as public
places of congregation is not unduly limited.1 If a properly narrow ordinance
is enforced discriminatorily, then redress may be had under the unconstitutional-
as-applied branch of the equal protection doctrine. The court should not take
away the right of the city to regulate the use of its parks altogether' in order to
protect the hippies--especially when better means were available.'
Fred W. Schwendimann
a change of venue in a criminal case because he felt his hairstyle and mode of dress would
prejudice the jury. The court in Prazier stated:
[TIhere is another element here in his [defendant's) favor, perhaps more
elusive but potentially no less significant. . . . Many residents of Santa Cruz
County felt a deep-seated antagonism towards hippies, which they expressed
both in person and through their local government representatives. [Citing
the urgency declaration in Parr.] . . . We recognize that in some criminal
trials there is at least the possibility, regrettably, that the defendant may bejudged on his appearance and life style rather than on his proven acts. In
the circumstances here shown, however, that consequence is more probable
than possible.
5 Cal. 3d at 293-94, 486 P.2d at 698-99, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 802-03. In granting a change of
venue, the court concluded that it would be impossible to believe that a jury could be im-
partial, just as the court in Parr stated that discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance
was inevitable, though not proved.
41 [T]he question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as
not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the oppor.
tunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public ques.
tions immemorially associated with resort to public places.
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
42 As the court stated: "The legislative intent is indelibly expressed in the urgency clause
which by definition must state relevant and persuasive facts necessitating the legislative ac-
tion." 3 Cal. 3d at 865, 479 P.2d at 356, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 156 (emphasis added). It is
doubtful the city can ever remove the "taint" of this declaration. In effect, the city council
may well have destroyed any chance it had of regulating the use of the parks except in the
most innocuous ways.
' In Antonello v. City of San Diego, 16 Cal. App. 3d 161, 93 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1971), an
intermediate California appellate court was called upon to apply the principles announced
in Parr. That court properly recognized a distinction that Parr did not--i.e., that purpose
and motive were not the same:
Where the purpose of a statute is relevant to a determination of its con.
stitutional validity a court, to ascertain such purpose, may examine its im.
mediate objective and ultimate effect as well as events leading to its passage
[citing Parr and Mulkey] . . . , but not the motives influencing legislators
in voting its passage . . . . A statute effecting a valid purpose is valid regard.
less of the motives actuating its enactment . . . .
16 Cal. App. 3d at 166, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 822. If Parr stands only for the proposition that
legislative purpose may be considered, it does little but add some authority to that doc-
trine. However, since the only logical construction in Parr seems to be that the purpose of
the ordinance was to preserve the parks, and the motive was to "get" the hippies, then Parr
must stand for the proposition that motivation may be looked to. Hence, the above state-
ment of the law in Antonello is either wrong, or the California courts are not going to
follow the reasoning in Parr.
